Achieving an adequate balance between the level of complexity, objectivity and comparability which is required within the capital framework: credit ratings and the Standardized Approach (SA-CCR) for measuring Exposure at Default (EAD) for Counter-Party Credit Risk by Ojo, Marianne
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Achieving an adequate balance between
the level of complexity, objectivity and
comparability which is required within
the capital framework: credit ratings and
the Standardized Approach (SA-CCR)
for measuring Exposure at Default
(EAD) for Counter-Party Credit Risk
Marianne Ojo
North-West University South Africa
25. May 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56209/
MPRA Paper No. 56209, posted 28. May 2014 12:57 UTC
1ABSTRACT
Achieving an Adequate Balance between the Level of Complexity, Objectivity and 
Comparability Which is Required within the Capital Framework: Credit Ratings 
and the Standardized Approach (SA-CCR) for Measuring Exposure at Default 
(EAD) for Counter-Party Credit Risk
 
Credit ratings have assumed an increasingly formidable and important role over the years. An increased 
role and revisions to its foundations, have been triggered, not only in view of the shortcomings of credit 
ratings based criteria, as revealed through the recent Financial Crisis, but also the need to update Basel 
II - which has served as the foundation for credit ratings in several jurisdictions. Credit ratings serve 
various vital purposes, most notably of which include the determination of capital requirements, the 
identification and classification of assets, and the provision of reliable estimation and assessment of 
credit risk.
The criteria required to be satisfied by credit rating agencies, namely: objectivity, independence, 
transparency, disclosure, resources and credibility, are closely linked, since the level of comparability 
and consistency of information provided by such agencies, could also serve as a useful indicator that 
such information is reliable and credible. 
In response to the changing financial environment - the evolution and emergence of new and more 
complex forms of risks and financial products, credit rating agencies have extended their scope beyond 
the coverage of their traditional products. As well as assessing whether the scope of products presently 
covered by rating agencies could be deemed adequately relevant to the criteria required to satisfy 
information being provided as credible, this paper also addresses the reliability of credit scoring 
methods and models. Are those measures used in estimating the probability of default, namely, 
financial statements, market prices of a firm’s debt and equity, and appraisals of the firm’s prospects 
and risk sufficiently indicative as to provide a reliable estimate of the firm's probability of default? 
2The vital role of audits in verifying the credibility of information in financial statements  is therefore 
evident. The reliability and consistency of credit ratings across different jurisdictions, sectors - 
financial, non financial sectors, and rating agencies, as well as the reliability of the approach for 
assessing ratings constitute major areas to be addressed. This in part, being attributed to the difficulties 
with achieving a balance between risk-sensitivity and comparability. 
The Basel III leverage ratios also being crucial to achieving an acceptable balance with risk-sensitivity 
- such that the capital framework is not considered unduly risk-sensitive - as was the case with Basel II. 
The increased importance attributed to credit ratings is also reflected by the Basel Committee’s recent 
introduction of the Standardized Approach (SA-CCR) for measuring exposure at default (EAD) for 
counter-party credit risk (CCR). The SA-CCR is intended to replace both current non-internal models 
approaches, the Current Exposure Method (CEM) and the Standardised Method (SM). The SA-CCR 
will  apply to  OTC derivatives,  exchange-traded  derivatives  and long settlement  transactions.  Risk 
models  have  certainly  become  increasingly  complex  and  relevant  -  however,  is  such  level  of 
complexity correspondingly and adequately balanced with the level of objectivity and comparability 
which is required within the capital framework?
Key Words: credit ratings, OTC derivatives, objectivity, forecasting, assets, liquidity, risk sensitivity, 
leverage ratios, audits, information asymmetries
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I Introduction
The criteria required to be satisfied by credit rating agencies, as a means of generating high quality 
external credit assessments, namely:2 objectivity, independence, transparency, disclosure, resources and 
credibility,  are  closely  linked,  since  the  level  of  comparability  of  information  provided  by  such 
agencies, could also serve as a useful indicator that such information is reliable and credible. However 
these criteria – and particularly that relating to objectivity, have been called into question recently.
This has been triggered by the changing financial environment - as well as the evolution and emergence 
of  new  and  more  complex  forms  of  risks  and  financial  products.  Correspondingly,  credit  rating 
agencies have responded by extending their scope beyond the coverage of their traditional products.
The uses of credit ratings, according to the Joint Forum, include the following:3
− the determination of capital requirements;
− the identificatio or classification of assets;
1 Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Administration, North-West University, South Africa 
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2 As stipulated under Paragraph 91 of the Basel II framework. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Joint 
Forum, Stocktaking on the Use of Credit Ratings at page 20 http://www.bis.org/press/p090615.htm
3 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Joint Forum, Stocktaking on the Use of Credit Ratings pages  3 and  4
5− the provision of credible valuation of credit risk;
− the determination of disclosure requirements; and
− the determination of prospectus eligibility
Revisions  and  Adjustments  Undertaken  By the  Basel  Committee  to  Improve  the  Effectiveness  of 
Measures of Bank's Resilience to Financial Crises
Out of the five indicators of a bank's strength, as reflected by the CAMEL4 system, efforts made in 
relation to capital adequacy requirements will constitute the focus of this paper. Hence the ensuing 
section,  section  II,  commences  with  an  introduction  to  the  Standardised  Approach  for  Measuring 
Counter  Party Credit  Risk – as well  as developments which have culminated in its  introduction – 
namely  the  gaps  identified  with  Basel  II,  and  the  need  to  sufficiently  account  for  previously 
unquantified volatile transactions and risks. The quality of information provided by credit ratings, as 
well as the role of credit ratings agencies in addressing asymmetric information will constitute one of 
those issues to be addressed under section III. In view of the ever increasing significance of risks in 
financial and regulatory environments, as well as the need to quantify and regulate such risks, should 
the quality of audits and the role assumed by audits not be factored into credit ratings processes? The 
role of audits in the capital markets of several major economies and their significance in verifying and 
facilitating credible, reliable and accurate information and signals within capital markets have been 
discussed extensively in the literature. Section IV highlights why audits and auditors have assumed 
such a vital role within an increasingly risk based regulatory environment. Section V then concludes by 
focussing on one of the themes of the paper – namely the need to balance the level of complexity, 
objectivity and comparability which is required within the capital framework. In view of considerable 
regulatory,  audit  and accounting  differences  which  persist  across  jurisdictions,  could  credit  ratings 
based criteria  really be considered to  be adequately objective? Furthermore,  given the crucial  role 
assumed by external auditors in the regulatory and supervisory process, as well as their prominence 
within  the  Basel  Committee's  Core  Principles  for  Effective  Banking  Supervision,  should  this 
fundamental issue not constitute a greater focus for redress in emerging economies? Will recent efforts 
by the Committee to address capital adequacy and leverage ratios be undermined since an underlying 
4 Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity
6issue has  still  not  been  addressed  in  several  emerging economies?  Are those  emerging economies 
which are concerned justified in their reluctance to adequately embrace audits – based on cost- benefit 
considerations? These are amongst some of the points which this paper will seek to address. In so 
doing,  the  paper  will  contribute  to  the  extant  literature  on  the  topic,  not  only  through  the 
recommendation of a novel approach and an alternative means whereby more reliable and credible 
information  could  be  obtained,  but  also  the  rationale  for  adopting  such  means  of  verification. 
Furthermore, it will aim to demonstrate that information obtained from credit rating agencies, even if 
timely, could still fall short of the all-important attributes of reliability and credibility where sources of 
information  have  not  been  adequately verified  as  credible,  and  where  transparency and disclosure 
measures do not exist to facilitate comparability within the process.
II The Standardised Approach for Measuring Counter Party Credit Risk (SA-CCR)
The Standardised Approach for Measuring Counter Party Credit Risk (SA-CCR) replaces both current 
non-internal model approaches – the Current Exposure Method (CEM) and the Standardised Method 
(SM).  Efforts  aimed  at  ensuring  that  volatile  transactions  are  captured  –  as  well  as  previously 
unaccounted for risks, are evidenced by the following rationales for introducing the SA-CCR and the 
criticisms attributed to the previously existing non- internal model approaches – which include the 
fact:5
− That the Current Exposure Method, did not, in particular,  distinguish between margined and 
unmargined transactions;
− That the supervisory add-on factor did not sufficiently capture  the  level  of  volatilities  as 
observed  over  recent  stress  periods,  and  the  recognition  of  netting was  too  simplistic  and 
not  reflective  of  economically  meaningful  relationships  between derivatives positions;
 
− That  the  Standardised  Method,  even though  more  risk-sensitive  than  the  Current  Exposure 
5  Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, Standardised Approach for Measuring Counter Party Credit Risk at  page 1 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs279.htm
7Method, did not differentiate  between  margined  and unmargined transactions or sufficiently 
capture the level of volatilities observed over stress periods in the last five years. Further,  given 
the inability to implement the Standardised Method,  or  implementing  it  inconsistently.  
− The   relationship   between   current   exposure   and  potential  future  exposure  (PFE)  was 
misrepresented  in  the  Standardised  Method  because  only  current  exposure  or  PFE  was 
capitalised.  
− Finally,  the  Standardised Method  did  not  provide  banks  with  a  true  non-internal  model 
alternative  for calculating EAD because the Standardised Method used internal methods for 
computing delta-equivalents for non-linear transactions. 
The Second Consultative Paper, issued by the Basel Committee in January 2001, introduced the two 
Internal  Ratings  Based  (IRB)  methodologies  –  the  Foundational  IRB  and  the  Advanced  IRB 
methodologies. The Internal Ratings Based approach to capital requirements for credit risk, not only 
relies significantly on the internal assessment carried out by a bank, in relation to counterparties and 
exposures, but is also geared towards the achievement of two primary goals, namely:6 „additional risk 
sensitivity“ and „incentive compatibility“.
Basel  II  is  premised  on a  three  level  approach which  permits  banks  to  select  from three  models, 
namely: the basic standardized model, the IRB foundation approach and the advanced ratings approach. 
According to the Consultative Document on Standard Approach to Credit Risk,7 capital requirements 
under  the  standardized  approach are  considered  to  be  more  syncronised  and in  harmony with  the 
principal elements of banking risk – owing to the introduction of more differentiated risk weights and a 
broader recognition of techniques which are applied in mitigating risk whilst such techniques attempt to 
avoid undue complexity. As a result, capital ratios generated through the standardized approach, should 
adapt more to present and actual risks encountered by banks, than was the case previously. 
Under  Pillar  One minimum capital  requirements,  operational  risk is  to  be corroborated by capital. 
6 In  establishing an  Internal  Ratings  Based  approach,  the  Commitee's  intention  was  directed  at  „fine  tuning  capital 
requirements with a greater degree of accuracy to the level of a bank's exposure to credit risks.“ Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 'The Internal Ratings Based Approach' Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord 
2001 at pages 1 and 3 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf 
7 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document, Standard Approach to Credit Risk, Supporting 
Document to the New Basel Accord January 2001 at page 1 http;//www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf
8Measurement  approaches  for  operational  risk  can  be  found in  the  Capital  Requirements  Directive 
(CRD) and there are three broad approaches to the capital assessment of operational risk which are as 
follows:
− Basic Indicator Approaches
− Standardized Approaches
− Internal Measurement Approach
Basel II constitutes the foundation for credit  ratings in several  jurisdictions.  However,  failures and 
flaws of Basel II, as revealed during the recent Financial Crisis have prompted revisions, which have 
been  made  to  the  framework  for  determining  capital  requirements  for  bank  exposures  to  central 
counterparties – as  introduced through a new section (Section XI) of Annex 4 of the International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework - Comprehensive 
Version, June 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “Basel II”).8
Exposures  to  central  counterparties  arising  from  OTC  derivatives,  exchange-traded  derivatives 
transactions,  SFTs and long settlement transactions are to be subject to the counterparty credit risk 
treatment laid out in paragraphs 188 to 211 of the Annex (Section XI) of Annex 4 ).9 Exposures arising 
from the settlement of cash transactions (equities, fixed income, spot FX and spot commodities) are not 
subject to this treatment.10
Within  the  Basel  II  framework,  external  ratings  are  used  for  the  purpose  of  enhancing  the  risk 
sensitivity of the framework.11  They are not only primarily used under the standardised approach for 
8  „Regardless of whether a CCP is classified as a QCCP, a bank retains the responsibility to ensure that it maintains 
adequate capital for its exposures. Under Pillar 2 of Basel II, a bank should consider whether it might need to hold 
capital in excess of the minimum capital requirements if, for example, (i) its dealings with a CCP give rise to more risky 
exposures or (ii) where, given the context of that bank’s dealings, it is unclear that the CCP meets the definition of a 
QCCP.“  See  Basel  Committee  for  Banking  Supervision,  Capital  Requirements  for  Bank  Exposures  to  Central 
Counterparties, April 2014 at page 4  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs282.htm
9  Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, Capital Requirements for Bank Exposures to Central Counterparties, April 
2014 at page 6 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs282.htm
10 ibid
11 „For example, by being incorporated into assessments of the credit quality of an exposure or creditworthiness of a 
counterparty – and thus the imposition of capital requirements.“  See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, The 
Joint Forum, Stocktaking on the Use of Credit Ratings page  4 http://www.bis.org/press/p090615.htm
9credit risk, but also apply to risk-weight securitisations exposures - the different uses of external ratings 
corresponding to probability of default treatments under the standardised approaches, and to situations 
where the use of internally generated ratings is impossible or difficult given, for instance, the lack of 
statistical data for securitised products.12 
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the traditional rating agency product is „an 
assessment of the credit quality of individual debt issues of a firm.“13 In recognition of the changing 
financial  environment,  as well  as more complex risks associated with financial  products,  in recent 
years,  rating  agencies  have  expanded  their  coverage  to  other  debt  products and  have  introduced 
variants or refinements of their traditional products. Despite efforts made by rating agencies to adapt to 
changes in the financial environment, their credit scoring methods, approaches and models, and the 
reliability of these – particularly measures based on market prices, may still be questioned. As is the 
case with the inability of capital adequacy ratios and measures, on their own, to provide adequately 
reliable  indication  of  a  bank's  strength,  robustness  and  resilience  –  particularly  during  periods  of 
financial downturns, information provided by credit rating agencies should not be relied upon as being 
sufficient in their entirety. Just as liquidity and leverage ratios had to be introduced through Basel III to 
complement the risk-based capital adequacy framework for the inadequacies and flaws revealed during 
the  recent  Financial  Crisis,  there  is  need  for  closer  collaboration  between  supervisory  agencies, 
financial  institutions,  credit  rating  agencies  as  well  as  external  auditors  in  order  to  maximise  the 
benefits of those synergies arising from such a collaboration.
12 ibid
13  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Papers, No 3 August 2000, Credit Ratings and Complementary 
Sources  of  Credit  Quality  Information  at  page  5.  „Four  products  of  rating  agencies  that  might  possibly serve  as 
complements to more traditional ratings in a regulatory regime that relied on external credit ratings. First, issuer ratings 
make it possible to expand the universe of firms with credit ratings beyond those that have issued public debt. Second, 
bank loan ratings adjust for differences in expected recoveries often observed for bank loans in default relative to bonds 
in default. Third, bank financial strength ratings, by measuring stand-alone credit quality, allow an assessment of the 
dependence on the safety net for any particular set of banks. Finally, sovereign ceilings, which reflect country risk, 
denote the maximum foreign-currency rating that an entity domiciled in a particular nation can receive, with very few 
exceptions.“ see ibid
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III  Is  Information  Provided  through  Credit  Ratings  Agencies  Superior  to  those  of  Macro 
Economic Indicators? This appears to be a jurisdictional based question.
„The  recent  crisis  highlighted  the  interface  between,  and  the  complementary  nature  of,  the  macroprudential  and 
microprudential elements of  effective supervision. In their application of a risk-based supervisory approach, supervisors 
and other authorities need to assess risk in a broader context than that of the balance sheet of individual banks.“ 14
A distinction  of  the  two categories  assumed by credit  ratings  is  required  in  order  to  facilitate  the 
understanding of their role  in impacting financial markets.
Credit ratings can be classified into two:
Investment grade designation
Speculative grade designation
The investment grade designation, the preferable and more elite class, is naturally the goal of many 
nations  - and this also relates to benefits associated with being upgraded to this class – namely, lower 
financing costs.
Various empirical studies associated with the impact of being elevated or downgraded to either of these 
grades,  have concluded on the basis  that  investment grade classes are often associated with lower 
spreads. According to a study undertaken by Jaramillo and Tejada, the investment grade designation 
reduces spreads significantly - „by 36 percent above and beyond what is implied by macroeconomic 
fundamentals.“15 Further,  as  indicated  in  their  investigation,  empirical  studies  have,  on  the  whole, 
discovered that better ratings are associated with lower spreads.16
14  Basel Committee for Banking Supervision,  Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision September 2012 at page 
5
15 See IMF Working Paper, Sovereign Credit Ratings and Spreads in Emerging Markets: Does Investment Grade Matter? 
March 2011 WP/11/44  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=24677.0
16  „Cantor and Packer (1996) concluded that a one-notch deterioration in credit ratings raises spreads by 25%. Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (2002) revealed that changes in sovereign debt ratings and outlooks affect financial markets in emerging 
economies, with average yield spreads increasing 2% points in response to a one-notch downgrade.“ See ibid at page 4 
For further empirical studies on these see ibid
11
Three basic types of information which are usually employed as a means of determining an enterprise'
probability  of  default  are:17 financial  statements,  market  prices  of  a  firm’s  debt  and  equity,  and 
subjective appraisals of the firm’s prospects and risk.
Audits constitute vital signalling mechanisms in capital markets – thus serving as crucial indicators to 
financial investors of the worth of the enterprise or firm which is being invested in or which may be 
potentially invested in.  In  view of  the fundamental  informational  role  assumed by audits  in  many 
industrial nations, it could be easily deduced that credit rating agencies would play less fundamental 
informational  roles  in  these  nations  than  in  emerging  economies.  However  such a  role,  given  the 
significance of audits in such countries, is to be based on the level of reliability and credibility of 
information  that  could be  provided by such agencies  –  and not  on the impact  of  downgrading or 
upgrading  credit  ratings.  The  severe  consequences  of  downgrading  any country's  credit  ratings  – 
regardless of whether such a nation is an emerging economy or an industrial nation cannot be over-
emphasized. From such a perspective, the impact of downgrading or upgrading a nation's credit ratings 
is distinguished from credit agencies'  roles or significance in providing reliable, credible and timely 
information. 
Two opposing views regarding  the  worth  and informational  value  of  credit  ratings  have  been  put 
forward by Kräussl:18
The first view:
− That credit agencies only have access to publicly available information and that these agencies 
lag behind financial markets in processing such information. Further, Kräussl adds that credit 
rating changes should not affect market prices if financial markets are efficient in semi-strong 
form.
The  opposing  view  not  only  argues  that  credit  rating  agencies  are  „specialists  in  obtaining  and 
17  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Papers, No 3 August 2000, Credit Ratings and Complementary 
Sources of Credit Quality Information at page 7 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp3.pdf
18  R Kräussl, „Do Credit Rating Agencies Add to the Dynamics of Emerging Market Crsies?“ CFS Working Paper No 
2003/18 August 2003 at page 9 http://www.frbatlanta.org/news/conferen/fsc04/kraeussl.pdf
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processing  information“,  but  that  sovereign  credit  changes,  as  well  as  negative  credit  ratings 
announcements are likely to generate more signficant impacts in emerging markets – owing to the level 
of severity of problems attributed to asymmetric information and transparency.
Why Credit Ratings Serve a Greater Role in Emerging Economies than Industrial Nations
It has been argued in many studies, that bank capital ratios and several other financial indicators do not 
serve as effectively in emerging market economies as is the case with industrial nations.  According to 
Rojas-Suarez (2002), the capital-to-asset ratio, has under-performed  as an indicator of banking crisis 
related  problems  in  Latin  America  and  Asia.19 Two  reasons  which  have  been  put  forward  as 
explanations for this are:20
− Severe deficiencies in the accounting and regulatory framework in these jurisdictions;
− Lack of liquid markets for bank shares, subordinated debt and other bank liabilities and assets 
which are required to confirm and justify the actual worth of a bank – rather than merely its 
accounting value.
To which  it  will  also  be  added that  audits,  which  serve  as  vital  signalling  mechanisms  in  capital 
markets, have limited roles in many emerging economies than is the case with industrial nations. 
However, it needs to be re- called that amongst several lessons drawn from the recent Financial Crisis, 
one of the most prominent is namely, the fact that, irregardless of whether a jurisdiction is an industrial 
nation or emerging economy, capital adequacy measures, on their own, no longer suffice as reliable 
measures or indicators of a bank's strength or ability to be resilient – particularly in times of crises. 
This, amongst other concerns – relevant to both industrial and emerging nations constitutes one of the 
principal reasons for the introduction of Basel III, and more specifically - the two liquidity standards, 
the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ration (NSFR), as well as the Basel 
III leverage ratios.
19  L Rojas-Suarez, „Rating Banks in Emerging Markets: What Credit Agencies Should Learn From Financial Indicators 
(2002) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=300891
20 Ibid, see abstract
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IV
The  Need  for  Auditors  and  External  Audits  in  An  Increasingly  Risk  Based  Regulatory 
Environment
Risks have become not only increasingly significant in the modern regulatory environment, but also 
serve as vital regulatory tools. Auditors and audits, furthermore, serve as fundamental and crucial  tools 
of quantifying risks. As highlighted several times, in the literature relating to risk, „in order for risks to 
be quantifiable or governable, they must be auditable“. Coupled with the inherent uncertain nature of 
risks is also the quantifiable, as well as unquantifiable aspect and characteristic of risk. In this regard, it 
is important to distinguish between risk and uncertainty. Whilst risk is traditionally associated with 
probability calculations – which suggests that an event can be predicted and controlled, „uncertainty is 
not capable of measurement and deals with possibilities incapable of calculation which are based on 
guesswork and judgement“.21
In  assessing  whether  the  current  regulatory  framework  appropriately  and  adequately  balances  the 
objectives, as set out in paragraph 29 of the Discussion Paper, „The Regulatory Framework: Balancing 
Risk Sensitivity, Simplicity and Comparability,“22 consideration is to be had to trade-offs required to 
find  the  right  balance:  Trade  offs  between  costs  in  improving  framework  in  a  bid  to  improve 
complexity, risk sensitivity – at the possible expense of simplicity and comparability.
Is the desire to achieve comparability, as well as simplicity, greater than the need to attain accurate, 
reliable and more relevant results through investment in more complex techniques? Such techniques 
involving not only initially high outlays but also costs (as well as risks) involved in managing such 
techniques?




In  view of the inconsistencies  and unreliability associated with relying solely on capital  adequacy 
ratios, measures introduced by the Basel Committee, which are designed to reduce reliance on a single 
capital  adequacy  ratio  as  the  primary  means  of  ensuring  the  soundness  of  banks,  are  therefore 
welcomed.  As  indicated  in  the  discussion  paper,  „The  Regulatory  Framework:  Balancing  Risk 
Sensitivity,  Simplicity  and  Comparability“,  such  measures  introduced  by  the  Basel  Committee, 
include:23
− The introduction of a leverage ratio
− An additional capital surcharge for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)
− A proposed framework for measuring and controlling large exposures
− Minimum liquidity and funding standards
In support of the comments highlighted by the Committee in its discussion paper,24 „risk is indeed 
multi-faceted  and  far  from  straight  forward  to  measure“  -  and  whilst  a  risk  sensitive  regulatory 
framework, definitely offers a number of benefits, the complexity resulting therefrom bears with it, 
„potentially adverse consequences.“
The  risk  based  capital  regime  should  definitely  remain  at  the  core  and  focus  of  the  regulatory 
framework for banks – supported by liquidity and funding metrics, as well as other measures such as 
the leverage ratio. 
Furthermore,  core  principles25 relating  to  requirements  for  coordination  and  cooperation  between 
23  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'The Regulatory Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity, Simplicity and 
Comparability' July 2013 at page 1 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs258.pdf
24 See ibid
25  „The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (September  2012, 
Core  Principles)  provide  a  framework  of  minimum  standards  for  sound  supervisory  practices and are considered 
universally applicable. Core Principle 27 focuses on prudential regulations and requirements for banks in relation to 
financial  reporting  and  external  audits.“  Paragraph  8,  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision,  Consultative 
Document,  External  Audits  of  Banks,  March  2013 ,  page  2.  Also  see  Basel  Committee  for  Banking  Supervision, 
„External  Audit  Quality and Banking Supervision“,  December 2008 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs146.htm; and „The 
Relationship  Between  Banking  Supervisors  and  Banks’  External  Auditors“,  January  2002 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.htm
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auditors and supervisors should constitute greater binding effects in all jurisdictions and for purposes of 
sovereign credit  ratings  determination.  These principles should also be corroborated by provisions, 
rules  and  regulations  which  stipulate  and  require  closer  working  relationships  between  national 
supervisors, external auditors and credit rating agencies.
Auditors' significance in the supervisory process in identifying areas of potential risks have also been 
acknowledged in  various  sections  of  the literature.26  If  audits  are  performed as  effectively,  in  the 
manner in which they are expected to be undertaken, then information provided by such audits should 
be credible and reliable. Whilst  the informational issue with credit agencies appears to be the timely 
processing  and  transmission  of  information  –  a  feature  which  depends  on  effective  exchange, 
coordination and communication between those agencies  and authorities  involved,  with audits,  the 
crucial issue appears to be the level of credibility of information, which if effectively implemented, 
could be provided.
Audits therefore, do not only serve as risk regulatory tools, capable of quantifying and regulating risks, 
but  also  a  means  of  verifying  financial  information  within  financial  statements  and  addressing 
information  asymmetries.  In  this  sense,  they fufil  a  vital  position  and dual  role  in  addressing  the 
rationales for financial regulation.
26 See M Ojo, „Audits, Audit Quality and Signalling Mechanisms: Concentrated Ownership Structures“ 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2372511 and  Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, paragraph 
6 page 31, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision September 2012 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf
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